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This paper addresses the economic impact of German advertising regulations.
The digital convergence of media provides a starting point for the analysis. This
convergence makes technically feasible “interactive product placement” (IPP),
the integration of interactively purchasable products in television programs and
movies for the purpose of advertising. Such advertising could conceivably out-
strip traditional product placement as a source of revenues for the ﬁlm indus-
try. Moreover, IPP could provide valuable incentives to create new audiovisual
hardware and software. As product placement is generally banned in Germany,
we critically review relevant regulations. Additionally, a simple model is devel-
oped that allows for a welfare economic approach to the analysis of an IPP ban.
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1 Introduction
Digital technology permits the use of devices such as personal computers and
television for similar functions. This digital “convergence” also makes it pos-
sible to provide consumers with interactive services. Until quite recently the
term “interactivity” was little more than a buzzword. In the case of television
broadcasting, for instance, it simply meant selecting programs or choosing
teletext pages. Viewers wishing to interact further had to communicate with
broadcasters or advertisers by email, telephone, or letters. Industry observers
report this situation is about to change dramatically,1 with the introduction
of enhanced television devices (e.g., set-top boxes) that allow viewers to in-
teract directly with web-based information.2 In practical terms, viewers will
be able to use their remote controls to purchase goods associated with the
broadcast without having to go online with their personal computer. The
change opens up possibilities for advertisers, not only in traditional spot
advertising, but also in connection with products appearing within regular
programing. Putting products directly into a program or ﬁlm is referred to as
“product placement” or “brand placement.” Product placement is currently
used as a means to help ﬁnance movies and TV programs.3
The combination of interactivity and product placement could alter the
market for product placement considerably. First, it is likely to enlarge
the market substantially and, hence, raise its weight in program ﬁnancing.
Traditional product placement is limited to branded products, i.e., prod-
ucts already familiar to the viewer. Interactive product placement (IPP) in
contrast is useful in building brands, because it makes any placed product in-
teractively identiﬁable and easy to buy.4 Second, the commercial possibilities
of IPP will likely motivate development of new products by the audiovisual
and telecommunications industries, and in the case of television, foster the
1See Blickpunkt:Film (2001) Interaktives TV mit analogem Fernsehen, No. 13., p.
43; Berger, R. (2000) T-Commerce could dwarf web sales, Electronic Media, November
6, 2000, and McDonald, K.A (2001) Advertisers test interactive arena, Variety, January
15-21, 2001 (Section: spotlight television).
2A number of television set manufacturers already oﬀer television devices with internet
access, e.g., Fujitsu Siemens Computers (Activy 300), Grundig (WB1), Loewe (Xelos
@media TV), and Commodore (Web.it ). There have been trials and tests of interactive
television since the 1970s. For a review of the history of interactive television trials and
experiences, see Carey (1997).
3For examples from the US, see Snyder (1992). German cases are described by Auer,
Kalweit, and N¨ ußler (1991).
4Digitalization also allows for new types of product placement. In a 1999 episode of a
US soap opera, a technology that allows advertisers to have products digitally added to a
scene was tested. That technology was subsequently used in sports broadcasts to add or
change content of commercial billboard areas seen during baseball and football games.2. LEGAL FRAMEWORK 3
development of new content formats and services as well.
In Germany, as elsewhere in Europe, however, advertising regulations –
above all, the principle of separation between programmingand advertising
– constitute major impediments to the deployment of IPP. Further, the po-
litical discussion seems very much concerned with the desirability of such
advertising methods.5
Thus, several questions arise. What speciﬁc regulations apply to IPP?
Will IPP be banned? Which arguments might favor IPP and what legal
counterarguments support a ban? How would the introduction of IPP aﬀect
economic welfare? We address these questions in the following discussion.
Our focus lies on the application of IPP to motion pictures.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 identiﬁes
the legal framework of IPP in Germany.6 Section 3 critically reviews that
framework and explores some of its economic dimensions. In this context, a
brief description of the US legal framework is provided. Section 4 presents a
simple equilibrium model that permits a welfare economic analysis of a ban
on IPP. Section 5 summarizes the main ﬁndings and concludes.
2 Legal Framework
German advertising regulations are complex and diﬀer extensively with re-
spect to media and services. In the following, we seek to examine regulations
potentially relevant to IPP. First, we turn to the ﬁeld of television broad-
casting and brieﬂy consider the established principle of separation of regular
programmingand advertising and its relation to surreptitious advertising, as
well as regulations and guidelines concerning speciﬁc classiﬁcations of ad-
vertising such as “teleshopping,” “long time advertising” (Dauerwerbung),
and “prop & wardrobe credits, and accompanying items” (Ausstatterhin-
weise, Begleitmaterial). Second, we discuss regulations that apply to movies
that are initially produced for theatrical release. Third, we look at so called
teleservices. Then, we consider the Deutsche Grundgesetz (German Basic
Law), and speciﬁcally, the rulings of the Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal
Constitutional Court - BVerfG) which provide the legal basis for the current
5This scepticism is well illustrated by a recent announcement of the Commission of
the European Communities of its intention to study new television advertising techniques,
in particular with regard to interactivity and product placement. The main focus of the
study is “...to analyze how to ensure a clear distinction between advertising and other
content.” See Commission of the European Communities (1999), p. 17.
6The focus of the legal analysis here is the German framework, which serves as a fair
representation of the regulatory environment found in much of Europe.2. LEGAL FRAMEWORK 4
framework for advertising legislation. We take these constitutional interpre-
tations into account in a critique of the current design of the legal framework.
2.1 Television Broadcasting
General Regulations
Advertising regulations in the ﬁeld of television broadcasting can be found at
three levels. At the highest level, there are EU directives that provide supra-
national guidelines.7 Within Germany, the Rundfunkstaatsvertrag (RStV)
governs broadcasting at the interstate level.8 Finally, there is speciﬁc media
regulation at the state level. Besides, there are television advertising guide-
lines issued by the public television stations and a special authority of the
federal states, the Direktorenkonferenz der Landesmedienanstalten (DLM),
which deals with advertising regulations in detail.9
For our purposes, it is at ﬁrst suﬃcient to discuss the RStV as it is the
primary source of regulations governing German television advertising. At
the heart of these regulations lies the principle of separating advertising from
other programing. This notion may well be considered the great dictum of
German broadcasting advertising law.10 The principle is spelled out in § 7
III RStV:
“Advertising and teleshopping must be clearly identiﬁable as such.
They have to be separated unequivocally from other programing, by
optical means in the case of television and by acoustic means in the
case of radio.”11
A violation of the separation principle may lead to television broadcasting
law complaints and can be prosecuted as a regulatory oﬀense. Of course, it
7Council Directive 89/552/EEC 03/10/1989. Oﬃcial Journal L 298, 17/10/1989, mod-
iﬁed by 97/36/EC, Oﬃcial Journal L 202, 30/07/1997 and the European Convention on
Transfrontier Television, 05/05/1989.
8Rundfunkstaatsvertrag vom 31. August in der Fassung des vierten Rundfunk¨ ande-
rungsstaatsvertrags, in Kraft seit dem 1. April 2000, GBl., Baden-W¨ urttemberg vom
30.12.1999. The Bundesverfassungsgericht in its very ﬁrst judgement on television broad-
casting in 1961 ruled that broadcasting legislation is, in principle, subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the states. See Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] [Federal
Constitutional Court] 12, 205 ﬀ. (F.R.G.) Therefore, interstate agreements similar to mul-
tilateral agreements under international law emerged alongside law at the federal level.
9The DLM consists of representatives from each state’s broadcasting authority. The
DLM seeks to coordinate the licensing of federal broadcasting, eﬀorts involving protection
of children and young persons against immoral inﬂuences, and the setting of advertising
guidelines.
10See Engels and Giebel (2000), p. 271.
11Author’s translation.2. LEGAL FRAMEWORK 5
is problematic to apply the separation principle strictly – advertisements
and brand name products are ubiquitous parts of everyday life. Therefore, a
program that does not display advertisements and brand names does not give
an authentic picture of reality. Moreover, it would be impossible to broadcast
reports about products. Consequently, it is beyond legal dispute that some
usage of brand name products and the ﬁlming of advertisements within the
scope of programming is tolerable.12 The distinction between admissible
and prohibited product presentations is provided by the term surreptitious
advertising deﬁned in § 2 II No. 6 RStV:
“Surreptitious advertising is the reference to or the presentation
of goods, services, names, trademarks or activities of a manufacturer
of goods or a supplier of services in programs when such reference
or presentation is intended by the broadcaster to serve advertising
purposes and can mislead the general public as to its real purpose.”13
The ban on surreptitious advertising is expressed in § 7 VI RStV. Infringe-
ments against this ban can result in a regulatory ﬁne and the conﬁscation of
revenues generated by surreptitious advertising (§ 49 I RStV).14
We can see that there are two elements to the deﬁnition of surreptitious
advertising: the broadcaster’s intent to advertise and the potential for viewer
deception. With respect to the broadcaster’s intent to advertise, section § 2
II No. 6 RStV explicitly enumerates broadcasters receiving a payment or a
similar valuable monetary consideration for product presentation. Further-
more, the legal literature suggests compulsory indication of the advertising’s
intent where contractual obligations with respect to a product placement
exist or if the screenplay has been adjusted accordingly.15 Therefore, there
is a strong likelihood IPP will be classed as surreptitious advertising under
existing television broadcasting law. With respect to IPP’s potential for
viewer deception, the RStV is silent. However, several rulings and discussion
in the legal literature indicate that traditional product placement is widely
12See Platho (2000), p. 48.
13Author’s translation.
14Regulatory ﬁnes run as high as ¿ 510,000. § 7 III RStV also reveals that the fulﬁllment
of the separation principle requires a clear identiﬁcation of advertising. Basically, this
means that advertising has to be readily recognizable as such, for example, by displaying
the caption “advertising” on screen. Such identiﬁcation is suﬃcient if it is displayed for
several seconds at the beginning of a block of commercials.
15However, the broadcaster’s intent is generally not considered with respect to the broad-
cast of pure licensing products, e.g., foreign movies or sport events that contain product
placement. In such cases, broadcasters will not be held liable. See e.g., Engels and Giebel
(2000), p. 278. We return to this matter later in the paper.2. LEGAL FRAMEWORK 6
considered as potentially deceptive.16 This perception is further supported
by other provisions of the RStV such as § 7 II RStV, which bans advertisers
and advertisements from having any inﬂuence on programming content or
editorial decisions.
Speciﬁc Regulations
The border between illegal surreptitious advertising and pure product presen-
tations is blurred. Legal practices, legislation, and broadcasting authorities
have therefore created narrower deﬁnitions for making the necessary distinc-
tions. Let us brieﬂy explore the most relevant terms with respect to their
applicability to IPP.
￿ Teleshopping
First, one might assume that IPP constitutes one of several permit-
ted types of “teleshopping” and, hence, could be classiﬁed as legitimate.
Teleshopping is generally deﬁned in § 2 II No. 8 RStV as a broadcast that
directly oﬀers goods and services to the public. On the other hand, the RStV
says teleshopping is subject to the separation principle of § 7 III RStV. Thus,
IPP will probably not be classed as a type of teleshopping under the RStV.
Second, “teleshopping channels” are not regulated by the RStV, but by
the Mediendienstestaatsvertrag (MDStV), an inter-state agreement on media
services. Such channels operate for the limited purpose of selling products to
their viewers. While one might logically presume that movies that contain
IPP could simply be transmitted via a pure teleshopping channel, § 9 II MD-
StV states that the “advertising must be clearly identiﬁable as such and has
to be separated unequivocally from other content of the services.”17 Again,
the separation principle is reﬂected in this provision, which suggests that
even on the teleshopping channel, which exists expressly to sell products, it
is likely illegal to show a movie that contains IPP.
￿ Long time advertising (Dauerwerbung)
Another type of permitted advertising that might be relevant with respect
to IPP is “long time advertising.” The classiﬁcation applies to infomercial-
type ads. Typically, such advertising is packaged as demonstrations, testimo-
nials, or game show formats. Although, the law oﬀers no explicit deﬁnition
of such advertising, it is characterized by a combination of advertising and
16See BGH “Boro” decision, I ZR 78/88 of 22.02. 1990 and Hartstein, Kreile, and Ring
(1999).
17Author’s translation.2. LEGAL FRAMEWORK 7
editorial parts of product presentations addressed under § 7 V RStV. The
advertising elements must dominate the presentation to ensure that the sep-
aration principle is followed, and the presentation must display writing that
clearly indicates that the purpose of the presentation is to sell a product.18
Again, although one might expect convergence to enlarge the market for such
presentations, IPP does not necessarily ﬁt the term because it will not neces-
sarily come to the fore in a broadcast. While some interactive presentations
may largely be sales events, the sales intention embedded with a movie is only
incidental. Again, IPP in movies will likely be banned, because it violates
the separation principle.
￿ Prop & wardrobe credits, accompanying items (Ausstatterhinweise, Be-
gleitmaterial)
Further, the “prop and wardrobe credits” view could be considered to
apply to IPP. In exchange for prop and wardrobe credits, producers of goods
such as furnishing and clothing make their products available at no cost to
movie or television show producers. In return, the product manufacturers are
mentioned in the end credits by the broadcaster. This approach is not banned
according to No. 19 DLM television guidelines. Naming products within
the program, however, is forbidden. The same holds for accompagnying
items that are intended to deepen the editorial content of a broadcast, e.g.,
a companion book to the ﬁlm.19 Moreover, money paid to use a prop is
generally considered to constitute surreptitious advertising. Thus, also due
to its ﬁnancing function it is unlikely that IPP will be classiﬁed as a legitimate
means of showing prop credits.
2.2 Theatrical Releases
IPP seems unlikely to occur in movie theatres. Nevertheless, it is reason-
able to discuss traditional product placement in ﬁlms, because the analysis
here provides insight into the legal discussion of this advertising method.
With respect to movies produced for theatrical release, competition law, in
particular, the Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb (Act Against Un-
fair Competition - UWG) contains provisions potentially relevant to product
placement. § 1 UWG, a universal civil blanket clause, has been invoked by
the courts in resolving previous litigation:20
18See Engels and Giebel (2000).
19See Engels and Giebel (2000).
20§ 3 UWG, which bans deceptive advertising, may also be somewhat relevant. However,
§ 3 UWG sets broader limits than § 1 UWG. For an extensive discussion of product
placement in the context of competition law, see Asche (1996), p. 52 ﬀ.2. LEGAL FRAMEWORK 8
“Whosoever in business dealings for the purpose of competition
takes up practices that oﬀend against good morals may be called upon
to cease and compensate for damages”21
The legal literature on this matter states that the potential harm of prod-
uct placement is covered by two areas of the law: consumer deception (fraud)
and rule infringement.22 With respect to consumer deception, it is argued
that product placement may be used as a means to circumvent natural con-
sumer skepticism about advertising. When consumers are not in a position
to deal critically with the product appearance, the product placement is seen
as an act contra bonos mores. Similarly, with respect to rule infringement, it
is argued that product placement gives the advertiser a competitive advan-
tage over its law-abiding business rivals and is a violation of the separation
principle and other RStV prescriptions.
Recently, the German Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court - BGH) con-
sidered product placement in detail with respect to the theatrical showing of
the movie Feuer, Eis und Dynamit.23 The court’s decision found that it is
reasonable to assume an audience will not be deceived by product placement
as long as the amount of product placement in a motion picture is no more
than “generally expected” and kept to a “tolerable” level. In addition, the
BGH demanded that the audience be informed about product placement.
Subsequent legal writings have considered product placement in the con-
text of motion picture production for initial theatrical release legal as long as
the product placement is announced to the audience.24 This view contrast
sharply with the rules concerning IPP in television broadcasting.
21Author’s translation. Apart from the legal consequences enumerated in § 1 UWG,
a contract that oﬀends good morals will void the contract and make it unenforceable.
A prominent German example of a voided product placement contract was seen in the
case of a textile ﬁrm’s advance payment of DEM 200,000 (approximately ¿ 102.500) for
a product placement in the popular music telecast “Formel 1.” Although the placement
never actually appeared, the ﬁrm’s attempt to recover its advance payment was not heard
by the regional court, because the court said the contract oﬀended good morals. See
Scheele (1986), p. 28, for this and other examples.
22See Asche (1996).
23BGH, 06.07.1995, in: Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1995, p. 3177 ﬀ. and BGH,
06.07.1995, in: Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1995, p. 3182 f., for discussion, see Asche
(1996), p. 72 ﬀ.
24A narrower evaluation of the BGH ruling is given by Hartstein, Kreile, and Ring
(1999), p. 60. Product placement is considered legal when no more than 20% of the
movie’s ﬁnancing stem from product placement. If this limit is exceeded, the use of paid
product placement must be announced to the audience before the movie is shown.2. LEGAL FRAMEWORK 9
2.3 Tele-Services
The federal Teledienstegesetz (TDG) law governs electronic telecommunica-
tions services for personal use, e.g., internet use. Under this law, no sepa-
ration of advertising and other content is necessary. The TDG clearly al-
lows IPP as part of telecommunications services provided to individuals and
clearly contradicts the regulation of IPP in television broadcasting.
To sum up, our analysis suggests that the regulation of IPP diﬀers in
accordance with the medium. IPP seems likely to be prohibited in television
broadcasting, permitted on a limited basis in movies primarily produced for
theatrical release (as long as the amount of IPP is tolerable and announced),
and permitted without restriction in electronic telecommunications services
provided to individuals.
2.4 Constitutional Issues
German Basic Law provides the legal basis for television broadcasting regula-
tions, competition law, and teleservices provisions. Therefore, an analysis of
constitutional aspects of IPP and traditional product placement may clarify
the underlying reasoning behind the diﬀerences in regulation depending on
media type.
With respect to competition law, German Basic Law can be used as a
guideline for interpretation of the civil blanket clause of § 1 UWG.25 The
literature suggests that from this perspective product placement ultimately
has to be judged as a balancing of artistic freedom as speciﬁed in Art. 5 III
phrase 1 Basic Law and consumers’ right to autonomously contract stated
in Art. 2 I Basic Law.26 The latter right implies that consumers have the
right to decide autonomously if they want to contract, with whom, how, and
what subject matter the contract might contain. However, to be in a position
to decide autonomously it is necessary that consumers can deal freely with
product advertisements. If a consumer is unaware that a product in a movie is
25The BGH argued for such interpretation in the Feuer, Eis und Dynamit case. Basic
constitutional rights, in principle, govern relations between citizens and the state, but they
may also be used as guidelines for interpretation of civil blanket clauses. See BVerfGE 73,
261 (269) (F.R.G.).
26Other German Basic Law provisions that protect product placement are the freedom
to freely choose one’s profession (Art. 12 I phrase 1) and the freedom of opinion (Art. 5 I
phrase 1). However, the freedom of artistic expression (Art. 5 III) rules these provisions
out. On the other hand, viewers’ interest in undisturbed movie viewing could also be
deduced from the general freedom of action Art. 2 I Basic Law. However, since viewer
decide herself to watch or not to watch a movie, it is implausible to refer to this provision.
For an extensive discussion of this issue see Asche (1996), p. 95 ﬀ.2. LEGAL FRAMEWORK 10
part of a product advertising campaign, he or she might view the advertising
message uncritically. Therefore, product placement can be considered to
disturb the consumer’s free decision of purchasing. Consequently, one faces
a trade-oﬀ between the freedom of art and the personal rights of Art. 2 Basic
Law, i.e., a trade-oﬀ between artistic freedom and consumers’ autonomy to
contract.
With respect to the ﬁeld of broadcasting, essentially Art. 5 I phrase 2
Basic Law has to be considered. It states,
“Freedom of the press and freedom of reporting by means of broad-
casts and movies shall be guaranteed.”27
While one might expect this provision supports the broadcaster’s freedom
to choose whether to broadcast product placements, the juridical interpre-
tation is quite the opposite. The key to this surprising interpretation lies
in a number of seminal decisions by the Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal
Constitutional Court - BVerfG). These serve as reference points for all tele-
vision broadcasting regulations.28 Traditionally, the ruling of the BVerfG
has stated that the freedom of broadcasting must serve primarily as a means
to ensure the process of free and comprehensive formation of personal and
public opinion, which is considered essential in a pluralist democratic so-
ciety. Therefore, the freedom to broadcast and report freely is considered
to represent an institutional guarantee, rather than a basic right to pursue
one’s own interests.29 Moreover, the BVerfG considers television broadcast-
ing, due to its scope and suggestive power, to be of special importance in the
process of opinion building.30 The essential role of television broadcasting
also extends beyond information dissemination and political broadcasting to
the ﬁeld of entertainment.31 In this context, the separation principle can be
considered to protect the “market for opinions” within society.32 Any direct
or indirect inﬂuence on programming is considered to be incompatible with
this protective function.33 Hence, television broadcasting legislation consid-
ers the separation principle to be a means to protect the function of free
27Translation from Steiner (1996), p. 129.
28So far there have been eight decisions. These “broadcasting decisions” are milestones
in the interpretation of German broadcasting law: BVerfGE 12, 205 ﬀ. (F.R.G.); 31, 314
ﬀ. (F.R.G.); 57, 295 ﬀ. (F.R.G.); 73, 118 ﬀ. (F.R.G.); 74, 297 ﬀ. (F.R.G.), 83, 238 ﬀ.
(F.R.G.); 87, 181 ﬀ. and 90, 60 ﬀ. (F.R.G.).
29BVerfGE 57, 295, 320 (F.R.G.) and BVerfGE 87, 181, 197 (F.R.G.).
30BVerFGE 90, 60 (87) (F.R.G.).
31BVerfGE 90, 60 (87) (F.R.G.).
32See BVerfGE 57, 295 (323) (F.R.G.), regarding the term “market for opinions” (Mei-
nungsmarkt).
33BVerfGE 90, 60 (87) (F.R.G.).3. CRITICAL REVIEW 11
and comprehensive formation of opinions by the individual and the public at
large.
3 Critical Review
We have seen so far that juridical arguments supporting a ban on IPP are
essentially based on two grounds. First, following the traditional television
broadcasting model of the BVerfG, the ban protects the institutional guar-
antee of a free “market for opinions.” Second, the ban attempts to protect
viewers from deception that could occur if products appear unannounced in
a broadcast. We next question whether these arguments are necessarily suf-
ﬁcient to justify a total ban on IPP and consider the problems that could
arise from a ban on IPP.
3.1 The “Market for Opinions”
Lets start out with a potential economic argument in favor of a ban on
IPP. With respect to the protection of the “market for opinions” Akerlof’s
“market for lemons” (Akerlof (1970)) might be addressed. If IPP is assumed
to reduce program quality, and quality cannot be observed by viewers (but
by broadcasters), the market for programs may work ineﬃciently or even
break down. The reason is that with IPP broadcasters have less incentives
to show programs without IPP, because IPP rewards them with additional
revenue. Thus, the market adversely selects by substituting programs with
IPP for programs without IPP. The “market for opinions” becomes biased
towards motion pictures containing IPP. As this problem arises from the
informational asymmetry between broadcasters and viewers, the introduction
of a simple obligation to inform viewers about IPP may resolve it. Thus, a
simple policy measure can create symmetric information so that there is no
“market for lemons”-problem in the “market for opinions.” Note that to
the extent the announcement fails to inform viewers, e.g., because viewers
may forget or ignore the announcement, a bias towards IPP movies remains
possible. However, with respect to IPP broadcasters have strong incentives to
make sure that viewers are informed, because they want viewers to “click” on
IPP products. This constitutes a contrast to traditional product placement.
Thus, overall a ban on IPP in order to prevent a “market for lemons” problem
seems misguided.
Other arguments against a ban can also be suggested. First, we should
remember television broadcasting is only part of the “market for opinions.”
This market also includes radio, newspapers, books, personal conversations,3. CRITICAL REVIEW 12
and increasingly the internet.34 Therefore, the “scope and suggestive power”
of television broadcasting as suggested by the BVerfG is decreasing. Second,
it seems unlikely that movies as escapist entertainment are as important in
building public and personal opinion as informative programs such as news,
current events analysis, or documentaries. Third, movies exist in enormous
diversity. In Germany, viewers can choose between 46 television channels
with a nationwide license, and many foreign stations available via satellite.35
In 1998, 10,864 diﬀerent movies were broadcast on 21,492 occasions.36 Thus,
viewers had access to over 29 movies a day. Given this enormous variety and
the demanding tastes of audiences,37 it seems implausible to argue IPP would
signiﬁcantly restrict the process of opinion building. Fourth, the “market
of opinions” is protected by various television broadcasting provisions that
supplement general competition law. For instance, the RStV prescribes that
private television broadcasting groups that reach more than 10% of view-
ers on an annual average have to provide transmission time for independent
third parties. Broadcasting groups that reach on average more than 30% of
viewers have to sell stakes of related media companies or, alternatively, have
to provide transmission time for independent third parties and have to set
up an “advisory program council” that consists of members that represent
the spectrum of opinions within society. The council then has various in-
formational rights and changes of the program scheme have to be approved
by the council (see RStV §§ 25-32).38 Fifth, public television broadcasters
(which still reach, by far, the largest average share of viewers) are obliged to
provide programs that represent a variety of opinions.
We conclude it is implausible to suggest that IPP will endanger the “mar-
ket for opinions.”
34The potential of the internet as a tool for political organization is often recognized in
public debate with respect to non-governmental organizations, and, in a negative context,
e.g., with respect to extremist groups. Moreover, questionnaires indicate that 34% of
internet users state that they watch less TV due to internet use (See Media Perspektiven,
No. 8, 2001, p. 389).
35See Kommission Zur Ermittlung der Konzentration Im Medienbereich - KEK (2000)
- (Commission for the investgation of media concentration - KEK).
36Kommission Zur Ermittlung der Konzentration Im Medienbereich - KEK (2000), p.
26.
37See e.g., De Vany and Walls (1999).
38Up to now there have been no private television broadcasting-groups that reach more
than 30 per cent viewer share. The two obvious candidates, Kirch Group and RTL Group,
reach about 25 to 28 per cent average viewer share. See Kommission Zur Ermittlung der
Konzentration Im Medienbereich - KEK (2000), p. 24. Due to the insolvency of parts
of the Kirch Group in early 2002 the market structure is likely to change in the future.
However, so far it remains an open question how the insolvency will aﬀect the market
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3.2 Viewer Deception and Confusion
With respect to viewer autonomy, the Feuer, Eis und Dynamit ruling of the
BGH suggested that deception of viewers can be prevented as long as the
audience is reasonably forewarned of the product placement. We argue, as
above, that this consideration could also be applied to the ﬁeld of television
broadcasting. The deception of television viewers could easily be avoided by
obliging broadcasters to announce that the broadcast movie contains IPP. For
instance, such an announcement could be realized by a simple symbol that
appears on the screen during the transmission of a movie that contains IPP.
This solution would be similar to teleshopping and long time advertisement
regulations and should reasonably prevent deception of viewers. Moreover, as
stated above, even without an obligation, broadcasters have strong incentives
to announce IPP voluntarily, because they want viewers to “click” on the IPP
products oﬀered. Unlike traditional product placements, the fact that the
viewer may actively seek information about a product helps avoid viewer
deception.
Further, the current ban on traditional product placement in television
broadcasting may actually be counterproductive, since it is not enforced
strictly. Product placement occurs routinely on German TV screens as US
and other foreign productions often contain product placements. This is
tolerated, because legislators and courts consider a trade-oﬀ between the
freedom of program choice and the risk of surreptitious advertising to be
acceptable.39 One might also presume that German productions sometimes
breach the separation principle, since it is diﬃcult to provide evidence and
enforcement costs are high. Moreover, German movies initially produced for
theatrical release are permitted to legally contain product placement. These
motion pictures, however, typically ﬁnd their way to television, too. Taken as
a whole, this constitutes a confusing situation for television viewers. Viewers
that believe in good faith that the ban on product placement is consistently
enforced under the current regime seem more likely candidates for deception
than viewers reasonably apprised of product placement or IPP in a movie.
3.3 Potential Cost-Ineﬃciencies/Dynamic Ineﬃciencies
Media-dependent IPP regulations, and most notably the discrepancy between
internet-related services and television broadcasting, will become increasingly
meaningless with convergence. Future viewers could own a device that en-
ables them to surf the internet, watch television, play music, and possibly
39See Engels and Giebel (2000), p. 278.3. CRITICAL REVIEW 14
call their friends. In a convergent world, then, the viewer’s susceptibility to
deception is quite independent of the transmission technology.
Given that the actual technological realization of IPP is still an open
question, existing regulations could prevent a cost-eﬃcient application of
IPP. Technologies that are relatively close to traditional television broad-
casting are likely to be banned while teleservices-oriented technologies such
as internet-based applications of IPP are permitted. Furthermore, hampering
a new technology always implies the risk of dynamic ineﬃciencies.
3.4 US Regulations and Competitive Disadvantage
In the US, the legal setting diﬀers considerably from German legislation. In
the US motion pictures that are produced initially for theatrical exhibition
face no regulations at all. Nevertheless, product placement has been in pub-
lic debate for a while and some critics are seeking legislative regulations.
For instance, the Center for Science in the Public Interest has called on the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and State Attorney General to
require that product placement be disclosed to theatrical movie audiences.
Similarly, the Center for the Study of Commercialism has asked the Fed-
eral Trade Commission (FTC) to require disclosure of product placement.
However, neither inquiry lead to the creation of any regulations.40
Regarding television broadcasting, product placement is not banned, ei-
ther. However, § 317 of the Communications Act of 1934 demands product
placement to be announced, if the station receives a payment:41
“All matter broadcast by any radio station for which any money,
services or other valuable consideration is directly or indirectly paid, or
promised to or charged by the station so television broadcasting, from
any person, shall, at the time the same is so broadcast, be announced
as paid for or furnished, as the case may be, by such person.”
Hence, there exist no regulations that would ban IPP in the United States,
if it is announced.42 Against that background, a ban on IPP may also create
40For details, see Snyder (1992), p. 312 and FTC File no. P 914518.
41In addition, a similar prescription is given by a FCC regulation. See § 73.1212 FCC
= 47 CRF 73.1212.
42Nevertheless, product placement could conceivably be classiﬁed as commercial speech
in a future decision. The theoretical argument here is that movies with product placement
are denied protection of freedom of speech under the First Amendment of the Constitution
of the United States. Hence, further regulation could be possible. However, Snyder (1992)
who provides an in-depth analysis of this issue concludes that “...such movies should not
be regulated under the commercial speech doctrine” (p. 309).3. CRITICAL REVIEW 15
a substantial competitive disadvantage for Germany with respect to prod-
uct innovations in the audiovisual and telecommunications industry. Con-
sider, for instance, innovative program formats and potentially associated
technological innovations that may be created by deploying IPP. Dynamic
ineﬃciency is also therefore relevant in this context.
In summary, we suggest that, from a Basic Law perspective, (i) neither the
protection of the “market for opinions” nor consumer deception necessarily
provide suﬃcient legal bases to outlaw IPP in Germany. Therefore, IPP could
be realized, if advertising regulations were modiﬁed. Further, we conclude
that (ii) the current ban on product placement is counterproductive, (iii)
may cause cost-ineﬃciencies with respect to technological choices, and (iv)
may induce dynamic ineﬃciencies. Finally, a ban on IPP (v) may constitute
a substantial international competitive disadvantage.
Interestingly, one aspect of product placement is usually not considered
in the legal discussion. That is the observation that viewers might simply feel
disturbed by product placement, especially, if product placement might have
inﬂuence on the “ideal” plot of a movie. In the following, part of the paper
we turn to this and other economic issues that explicitly refer to potential
costs and beneﬁts of IPP.4. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 16
4 Economic Analysis
In contrast to the juridical view on IPP, which stresses problems of viewer
deception and the role of television broadcasting for the “market for opin-
ions,” we do not consider these to be the main issues for IPP. Rather, we
seek to evaluate the possible ban on IPP against the costs it might cause and
the beneﬁts it might deliver to viewers, advertisers, and broadcasters.
Advertising serves as a link between product markets and the television
market. We consider that it entails both positive and negative eﬀects. On the
one hand, it disturbs viewers who would prefer to watch a program without
interruptions or product placement.43 On the other hand advertisements
ﬁnance the programing. Moreover, advertisers beneﬁt from selling products
as a result of advertising and broadcasters beneﬁt from “selling” their viewers
to advertisers.
Our intention is to perform welfare comparisons by contrasting two set-
tings: one with commercials (advertising spots) only and the other with com-
mercials and IPP.
4.1 Related Literature
Two strands of economic literature relate to our analysis. First, some empir-
ical work has been carried out on the eﬀects of advertising bans. This work
typically focuses on whether a ban on a speciﬁc type of product, such as alco-
holic beverages or tobacco, leads to less total demand. Duﬀy (1996) conducts
a survey of such studies and concludes that bans are generally ineﬀective. For
instance, Schneider, Klein, and Murphy (1981) analyze a ban on cigarette
advertising and ﬁnd that it caused an increase in total consumption. They
suggest that one reason for this result may be that a ban leads to lower pro-
duction costs (because advertising is costly) and, therefore, to lower prices.
Stewart (1993), in contrast, analyzes data on tobacco advertising bans in six
OECD countries and ﬁnds negative, but statistically insigniﬁcant, eﬀects on
total consumption. Theoretical literature on the issue is rare. One notable
exception is Motta (1997) who shows that the eﬀect of an advertising ban
depends on two crucial points: the extent to which the ban tightens aggre-
gate demand at given prices and the extent to which the ban results in lower
43Market research questionaires show that television commercials are by far the most
disliked type of advertising. A study from 1999 indicated that 98.8% of the interviewees
agreed that there is too much television advertising. In a similar questionaire 42.8% of
respondents found television commercials annoying. This indicates that there are, in fact,
nuisance costs from advertising (for reference see Media Digest (2000) Kino/Film/Video.
MMM/Hamburg, Issue 1/2000, p. 44 and p. 16).4. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 17
equilibrium prices due to less advertising induced product diﬀerentiation.
Advertising bans therefore may raise or reduce total consumption.
For our question, however, neither the named empirical nor theoretical
literature is particularly instructive, since we seek to analyze the eﬀects of
a ban on a speciﬁc type of advertisement and not the eﬀects of a ban on
advertisements for speciﬁc products. Moreover, the literature does not take
into account the fact that advertisements may impose nuisance costs on con-
sumers, which is vital for our analysis.
The second strand of related literature refers to the economic analysis of
television and radio program choice. Work in this ﬁeld traditionally focuses
on the question of how competition between broadcasters aﬀects program
diversity.44 It is frequently argued by critics that there would be too many
“mass appeal” programs and too few programs for viewers with specialized
preferences in television. This focus might be one reason for the neglect of
advertising, which is typically considered exogenous in such models. More-
over, beneﬁts to advertisers are usually ignored. There is, however, a growing
literature that considers advertising related issues more closely. For instance,
Vaglio (1995), Wright (1994), and Gabszewicz, Laussel, and Sonnac (1999)
address the eﬀects of advertising rate regulations on quality and program
diﬀerentiation.45 Vaglio (1995) applies a Hotelling-type approach and ﬁnds
that rate regulations may reduce the degree of program quality. Broadcast-
ers’ decisions on program quality depend on advertising rates: if they choose
higher advertising levels, a higher investment in program quality is neces-
sary to keep audiences watching the program. However, the paper does not
identify the equilibrium path of the associated sequential game, which re-
duces considerably the scope of the presented conclusion.46 Similarly Wright
(1994) explains that, although advertising quantity restrictions may reduce
nuisance costs, they may also reduce program quality. Therefore, its eﬀect
on viewers’ welfare is ambiguous. Gabszewicz, Laussel, and Sonnac (1999)
develop a three-stage sequential game with broadcasters, television viewers,
and advertising agencies. Broadcasters select their optimal program diﬀer-
entiation and their optimal advertising rates, taking into account an upper
44For comprehensive surveys, see Owen and Wildman (1992), Chapter 3 and 4, and
Brown and Cave (1992).
45In addition, Nilssen and Sorgard (2000) present a model of the television industry
that covers product markets, as well as markets for television programs. They ﬁnd that
under a TV monopoly, there may be both, more advertisements, as well as more viewers,
compared to a TV duopoly. Another model is given by Owen and Wildman (1985), who
assume that higher advertising levels lead to smaller audiences. They compare viewer
surplus under pure advertising and pure price competition and ﬁnd that viewer surplus is
identical for both settings.
46Gabszewicz, Laussel, and Sonnac (1999), p. 3., make this point.4. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 18
advertising limit imposed by the government. The authors ﬁnd that pro-
gram diversity rises with the level of advertising, while at the same time
nuisance costs from advertising increase. Within this model, the net eﬀect
of advertising regulation is positive, because the reduction of the nuisance
cost of advertising dominates the negative eﬀect of advertising regulation on
program diversity. Another facet of advertising in the television market is
presented by Anderson and Coate (2000). Their model considers that adver-
tising may entail negative external eﬀects on viewers, because broadcasters
care only about viewers who switch their channel oﬀ and not about viewers’
nuisance cost intensities. Therefore, ineﬃciencies concerning the number of
advertisements may occur. There are two potential sources of ineﬃciencies.
The market may provide too few or too many commercials. Speciﬁcally, the
result depends on the relative size of the social beneﬁts, i.e., the beneﬁts
from sales triggered by advertisements and program provision, on one hand,
and the nuisance costs which burden television viewers, on the other.
In the following we develop a model that is based on the approach of
Anderson and Coate (2000), but which extends their work in that it (i)
incorporates IPP as an additional source of broadcasters’ revenues, and (ii)
considers increasing marginal nuisance cost of both interruptive advertising
and IPP. The intention of our analysis is to assess economic welfare eﬀects
of the potential ban on IPP in Germany.
4.2 The Model
Television broadcasting is a good consumed by advertisers and viewers. In
general, it is a private good for advertisers and a public good from the au-
dience’s point of view.47 We consider advertising to provide information on
the existence of new goods to consumers and, therefore, to facilitate beneﬁ-
cial trades.48 We assume that there are two television broadcasters, A and
B, and two types of programs t ∈ {1,2}, both equally costly to produce.
47For simplicity, we ignore viewer exclusion.
48The role of advertising can be analyzed from distinct perspectives. The literature on
the matter can roughly be divided into two extreme positions. One claims that advertis-
ing acts as a means of persuasion and alters consumer preferences. Therefore, advertising
creates product diﬀerentiation that is not real. Work in this tradition is provided, e.g.,
by Kaldor (1950), Galbraith (1967), Solow (1967), and Nichols (1985). The second view
considers advertising primarily as a means of solving informational issues. Starting with
Telser (1964), numerous aspects of this role have been explored in the literature. Adver-
tising has been interpreted as a signal for product quality (Milgrom and Roberts (1986)).
We follow Butters (1977), Grossman and Shapiro (1984) and Stegeman (1991) in concen-
trating on advertising for new goods, i.e., we assume consumers only buy once they have
seen the product advertised.4. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 19
The production of a program only causes ﬁxed cost C. Further, two forms
of advertising, traditional commercials and IPP can be sold to advertisers.
Potential television viewers can be divided into two equally sized groups of
N individuals each. Each viewer is characterized by a pair (t,λ), where t
denotes the type of program the viewer prefers and λ denotes the fraction of
the viewing beneﬁts from the less preferred program. The variable λ is dis-
tributed uniformly on the interval [−ε,1] with ε ≥ 0. A viewer’s beneﬁt from
watching the preferred program is β, with β ≥ 0, and λβ from watching the
less preferred program. This beneﬁt can, due to nuisance costs, be reduced
by both types of advertising. We suppose that the marginal nuisance cost
of interruptive advertising increases with the number of commercials a and,
likewise, the marginal nuisance cost of IPP rises with the number of IPP z in
the program.49 This follows the concept of rising marginal disutility, which is
a standard concept in a number of economic ﬁelds associated with negative
or unpleasant issues. For instance, the cost of work in terms of eﬀort in labor
economics and pollution costs in environmental economics. Further, the cost
of advertising depends on a parameter γ ≥ 0 which represents the level of
nuisance cost of advertisements to viewers. This parameter is assumed to be
identical for all viewers and across the two forms of advertising. More specif-
ically, we suppose that a viewer’s net beneﬁt from watching the preferred
program is
u














from watching the less preferred program.50 A viewer who does not watch
any program receives zero beneﬁt. If λ is negative viewers suﬀer from watch-
ing the less preferred program and the larger ε, the more viewers fall in
this category.51 Finally, we assume that viewers who are indiﬀerent about
49The number z may also be considered to be the degree of negative inﬂuence of IPP
on the “ideal” plot of a movie.
50This formulation greatly simpliﬁes the analysis by implying that consumers receive no
beneﬁts from watching advertisements. However, product placements could conceivably
beneﬁt viewers. For instance, the way BMWs are presented in James Bond movies might
be appreciated by many viewers. The same holds for commercials. In Germany, the
Cannes Rolle provides a fun compilation of commercials that is even shown in movie
theatres.
51For some viewers, folk music could be costly to watch, while others might suﬀer from
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whether they watch a type-1 or a type-2 program will watch either program
with identical probability.
With regard to producers that wish to advertise, we assume that there are
m producers of new goods that can produce at most one product at a constant
cost per unit, which is set to zero without loss of generality. Each good is
of a type σ which is distributed uniformly on the interval [0, ¯ σ], with ¯ σ < 1.
A higher type σ indicates that a product is more attractive to consumers.
Each viewer watching a commercial or IPP will receive information on the
existence of the advertised good. If a viewer watches an advertisement she or
he will either have a willingness to pay ω > 0 for the product with probability
σ or a willingness to pay 0 with probability 1 − σ. The assumption that all
viewers have a willingness to pay ω or 0 implies that each producer will
set a price ω, because a lower price would not increase the probability of
a sale. Therefore, a producer of a good of type σ is willing to pay σω for
contacting each viewer. Furthermore, this implies that producers extract
all the surplus from the trades that are stimulated by advertisements, i.e.,
viewers do not beneﬁt from buying the advertised good. Moreover, we assume
that the information on the existence of a new good is the essential feature of
advertisements and, therefore, repetition of advertisements to the audience
does not increase the probability of a sale. Within this setting, producers
are indiﬀerent with respect to the kind of advertisement they choose.
The Ban: Commercials Only
If broadcasters sell advertising spots only, the demand for advertisements can
be described as follows. Let p denote the price per viewer of a commercial.
Then the number of ﬁrms that wish to advertise is a(p) = m·[1−
p
ω¯ σ] and the
corresponding inverse demand curve is p(a) = ω¯ σ · [1 − a
m] (see also Figure
2 on page 24).52 Note that each producer’s demand for advertising on one
channel is independent of its demand for advertising on the other channel,
due to the assumed constant marginal cost of production and the assumption
that viewers watch only one program.
The two broadcasters A and B are supposed to maximize their proﬁts
via the choice of the type of programming they oﬀer and the choice of the
price per viewer of commercials. We consider the situation as a three-stage
Cournot-type game. In stage one, each broadcaster chooses its type of pro-
gram and whether to operate. In stage two, given the choices of stage one,
each broadcaster chooses its proﬁt-maximizing level of commercials. In stage
52These functions are approximated to avoid analytical diﬃculties of step functions.
The ﬁt of the approximation depends positively on the number of producers of new goods
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three, given the choices of the previous stages, viewers decide if and which
program to watch. The subgame perfect Nash equilibria of this game can
then be solved by backward induction.
Consider stage 3 ﬁrst. Viewer decisions on watching a program depend
on the advertising levels of the broadcasters. If broadcaster A has the lower
advertising level, it will get all N type-1 viewers and those viewers of type 2
for whom (1−λ)β < 1
2γ(a2
B −a2
A) or, verbally, for whom the cost of viewing
the less preferred broadcaster is lower than the cost of more advertising
on the preferred broadcaster.53 Similarly, if A has the higher advertising
level, its program is watched by all type-1 viewers, except those for whom




Now, suppose that in stage two, broadcaster A chooses the type-1 pro-
gram and B chooses type 2. In this case, each broadcaster may set a price
per viewer p(aJ), J ∈ {A,B}, which is independent of the advertising level of
the other broadcaster, because each broadcaster has a monopoly in selling its
viewers to advertisers. On the other hand, the overall number of viewers each
broadcaster gets depends on the advertising level of the other broadcaster.
Accordingly, A’s and B’s proﬁt functions are:






with R(aA) = p(aA)aA and






with R(aB) = p(aB)aB.




























53For simplicity, we assume that each broadcaster chooses an advertising level that does
not drive all viewers away, i.e., a <
q
2β
γ . We take this into account in the welfare analysis
that follows, and naturally, exclude negative values for a.
54See the appendix to this paper for a detailed description of viewer choice and associated
broadcaster proﬁt functions.4. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 22
Expressions (1) and (2) reveal two eﬀects. The ﬁrst term of the marginal
proﬁt functions on the right-hand side represents the marginal revenues from
all viewers who watch the program of the broadcaster, while the second
term indicates the loss of revenues from viewers who switch to the other
channel. Obviously, broadcasters face a trade-oﬀ between a higher price per
advertisement against the loss of viewers that switch to the other broadcaster.
In equilibrium, the ﬁrst derivatives of A’s and B’s proﬁt function must
equal zero. It is straightforward to show that the equilibrium levels of adver-
tising a∗
A, a∗
B are equal such that a∗
A = a∗
B = a∗.55 Figure 1 illustrates the way
to that equilibrium. It depicts broadcasters’ reaction functions rA(aB) and
rB(aA), which represent the proﬁt-maximizing output for each output choice
of the other broadcaster. The Cournot equilibrium is at (a∗
A,a∗
B), where the
two reaction functions cross.
Tedious, but simple, evaluations show that the reaction functions have
positive slopes. Moreover, the slopes are smaller than one, which indicates
that a unique symmetric equilibrium exists.
By substitution of a∗ for a∗
A and a∗
B, the optimal decision of each broad-







In other words broadcasters maximize their proﬁts when marginal rev-
enues equal marginal costs, which are represented by the term on the right-
hand side of equation (3) and equal marginal lost revenues per viewer. In
terms of equation (3), the equilibrium is characterized by Figure 2 on page
24.
As can easily be seen from equation (3) and Figure 2, the level of a∗
depends negatively on the nuisance cost parameter and positively on viewers’
beneﬁts from watching television.













which we use for the determination of a∗ in the welfare analysis.
In stage one, both broadcasters will choose to provide diﬀerent programs.
If they chose the same type of program, competition for viewers would be
55Consider a∗
A > a∗
B. Both the ﬁrst term and the second term of the right-hand side of
(1) are negative. Hence, if a∗
A > a∗
B, there is no equilibrium. The same applies to a∗
B > a∗
A
with respect to (2).4. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 23
Figure 1: Reaction Functions and Cournot Equilibrium
introduced and result in zero proﬁts, because the broadcaster with less adver-
tising gains all viewers. Hence, rational broadcasters would not give up their
monopoly in selling their viewers to advertisers and would choose diﬀerent
programs.56
No Ban: Commercials and IPP
Now consider a case where broadcasters sell both interruptive advertising
and IPP. At stage 3, viewers’ decisions are similar to the case above. If
56For the sake of completeness, the question as to whether the channels would operate
at all depends on the extent of the ﬁxed cost C. There would be no operation where C
exceeds the revenues that one broadcaster generates. One broadcaster would operate if C
is less than these revenues, but exceeds each broadcaster’s revenues in the case that two
ﬁrms operate, and both would operate if C is less than the latter revenues. Given the
high number of broadcasters in the business, this question does not seem to be relevant
to reality.4. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 24
Figure 2: Optimal Number of Commercials
broadcaster A has the lower advertising level, it will get all N type-1 viewers






Similarly, if A has the higher advertising level, then its program is watched by






Turning to stage 2, note that broadcasters will sell the same amount of
a and z. This is an optimal strategy because, due to increasing marginal
nuisance costs, the number of viewers who stop watching the channel for a
given revenue is minimized if a = z. Therefore, the maximum “demand”
for each type of advertising becomes m/2 from each broadcaster’s point of
view such that half of the potential advertisers will be oﬀered interruptive
advertising and the other half will be oﬀered IPP. More speciﬁcally, let p◦
denote the per-viewer price of a commercial and q denote the per-viewer price




ω¯ σ] and z(q) = 1
2m·[1−
q
ω¯ σ], respectively. The corresponding
inverse demand curves are given by p◦(a) = ω¯ σ·[1−2a
m] and q(z) = ω¯ σ·[1−2z
m].
57See the appendix to this paper. We assume that broadcasters choose an advertising
level that does not drive away all viewers, i.e., a <
q
2β
γ − z2 and z <
q
2β
γ − a2. We
have to take this into account in the welfare analysis that follows. Naturally, we exclude
negative values for both types of advertising.4. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 25














◦(aA) + R(zA)] − C,














◦(aB) + R(zB)] − C,
with R◦(aB) = p◦(aB)aB, R(zB) = q(zB)zB.









B = θ∗. Hence, in equilib-









Figure 3 illustrates the optimal number of advertisements in equilib-
rium.58












which we use for the determination of θ∗ in the welfare analysis.
As before, in stage one both broadcasters will choose to provide diﬀerent
programs. If they chose the same type of program, competition would result
in zero proﬁts.59
4.3 Welfare Analysis
What are the total beneﬁts generated by the provision of advertising ﬁnanced
television with respect to the two cases considered above? Viewer beneﬁts
consist of the beneﬁts from watching their favorite program less the nuisance
cost of advertising. Advertisers gain from selling their products to viewers
and suﬀer from the price they pay for their advertisements. Broadcasters
58Note that Figure 3 is a simpliﬁcation. It is limited to two, instead of three, dimensions.
59With respect to channel provision there would be no operation where C exceeds the
revenues that one broadcaster generates. One broadcaster would operate if C is less than
these revenues, but exceeds each broadcaster’s revenues in the case that two ﬁrms operate,
and both would operate if C is less than the latter revenues.4. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 26
Figure 3: Optimal Numbers of Commercials and IPP
receive revenue from selling advertising space to advertisers less the ﬁxed cost
C of providing the program. These considerations give the following functions
of the overall beneﬁts B associated with advertising-ﬁnanced television.60
Assuming broadcasters operate and IPP is banned, total beneﬁts B are
B(a











The ﬁrst of the two terms represents viewers’ welfare in equilibrium, while
the second term accounts for the welfare of producers and broadcasters.61
60ﬁxed costs are neglected as C is the same in both cases. We are only interested here
in the diﬀerences in welfare.




0 ωσ(1 − α
m)dα − p(a∗)a∗ + p(a∗)a∗, which is simply the integral under the inverse
demand function up to a∗.4. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 27
With IPP beneﬁts add up to62
B(θ








The crucial question is in which case aggregated welfare is larger, i.e.,
if B(a∗) S B(θ∗). However, the general solution of this is relationship is
complex and not informative. We therefore solve the model parametrically.
In doing so, we ﬁrst solve for the optimal a∗ and θ∗ using (4) and (5), re-
spectively. Next, we calculate the associated welfare by substituting a∗ and
θ∗ in (6) and (7). Table 1 presents welfare results for diﬀerent assumptions
on the level of the nuisance cost γ.
The parameter values we have assumed are: β = 6,ε = 2,m = 15,ω =
0.03,σ = 0.9,N = 100. We have chosen these speciﬁc values in order to get
a close approximation of reality. For instance, β is 6 because rental charges
in video stores are about DEM 6 (¿ 3). Similarly, m is 15, because 15
commercials per movie seems a reasonable number, the product ωσ is 0.027,
because the price to contact 1000 viewers in German television is about
DEM 27 (¿ 14) for a 10 second spot.63 Only N has been chosen arbitrarily
(which has no qualitative eﬀects) such that numbers are kept small.64
The results indicate that a ban on IPP leads to a lower welfare level
if viewers feel disturbed by advertisements, i.e., if γ > 0. Moreover, both
viewer and producer/broadcaster welfare is higher where IPP is permitted
and overall advertising levels are higher with IPP. Interestingly, audiences
are better oﬀ, although we have assumed that viewers do not beneﬁt from
buying the products that are advertised and advertising levels are higher
with IPP. The reason for this observation is that viewers prefer a situation
where advertising spots can be substituted with IPP.
For γ = 0 we ﬁnd no diﬀerences in welfare. If viewers do not care about
advertisements, broadcasters oﬀer monopoly advertising quantities to pro-
ducers. These quantities are m/2 if there is only interruptive advertising and
m/4 in the case where IPP can also be sold to advertisers (see Figures 2 and
3).
To sum up, our analysis shows that toleration of IPP has the potential
to enhance economic welfare.
62This is a simpliﬁcation of B(a◦∗,z∗) = 2N(β − 1




m )dα + 2N
R z
∗
0 ωσ(1 − 2c
m)dc, which accounts for viewers’ welfare from watching the two
programs and for producers’ welfare.
63Source: IP Deutschland GmbH, 2000, TV-Werbung f¨ ur Einsteiger, p. 24.
64Many calculations with alternative parameter values gave us the same qualitative
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Nuisance cost level γ
0 0.01 0.025 0.05
Ban on IPP:
Total welfare B(a∗) 1230.40 1175.50 1099.30 986.66
Advertising level a∗ 7.5 7.39 7.22 6.96
Viewers’ welfare 1200.00 1145.40 1069.70 957.79
Producers’ & broadcasters’ welfare 30.40 30.10 29.60 28.87
No ban on IPP:
Total welfare B(θ∗) 1230.40 1202.70 1163.80 1104.50
Advertising level θ∗ 3.75 3.70 3.63 3.53
Advertising level 2θ∗ 7.5 7.40 7.26 7.06
Viewers’ welfare 1200.00 1172.60 1134.10 1075.40
Producers’ & broadcasters’ welfare 30.40 30.10 29.70 29.10
Table 1: Parametric Welfare Comparisons Ban vs. No Ban on IPP for Dif-
ferent Nuisance Cost Levels
5 Conclusion
Our analysis suggests that valid arguments can be made against the appli-
cation of the principle of separation to IPP. The essential objectives of the
principle of separation – the protection of the “market for opinions” and the
avoidance of “viewer deception” – are not at risk if IPP is introduced, pro-
vided the utilization of IPP is announced. This statement is supported by
several arguments.
With respect to the protection of the “market for opinions,” a bias to-
wards broadcasting motion pictures with IPP in the sense of Aklerof’s (1970)
“market for lemons” may easily be prevented by compelling broadcasters to
announce IPP. Moreover, broadcast motion pictures are only part of the
“market for opinions.” Further, competition for fastidious audiences, can be
expected to provide a variety of movies and opinions especially, because com-
petition is supported by numerous television broadcasting provisions that
supplement general competition law. Finally, public broadcasters, which
reach the largest share of viewers in Germany, are committed to present a
diversity of opinions.
Moreover, given the number of legal and illegal possibilities of achieving
product placement on the TV-screen, we suspect that the separation principle
actually confuses viewers and is, therefore, counterproductive.
Our critical review of the legal framework of IPP has shown that a ban5. CONCLUSION 29
may generate cost-ineﬃciencies in technological choices and create dynamic
ineﬃciencies. In addition, a ban may establish an international competitive
disadvantage. Our theoretical model on the eﬀects of a ban provides welfare
economic arguments that indicate IPP has the potential to enhance economic
welfare.
Summarizing, we would suggest that lawmakers should carefully consider
the application of the separation principle in the case of IPP. An obligation
to announce whether a program contains IPP seems suﬃcient to prevent
deception of viewers and helps advertisers to gain the beneﬁts of IPP. At
the very least, ﬂexible regulations such as the permission of IPP for private
broadcasters or speciﬁc channels should be considered.
With respect to the economic model we have proposed, it would be in-
teresting to explore a number of extensions in future work. Above all, an
analysis of the eﬀects of banning IPP on program diversity would be reward-
ing. Further, the impact of informational beneﬁts to viewers, asymmetric
nuisance costs and beneﬁts, asymmetric group size, and asymmetric values
of diﬀerent groups to advertisers could be addressed.Bibliography
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Determination of Broadcasters’ Proﬁt Functions
I. Commercials Only:
For the sake of simplicity, assume that Broadcaster A has chosen the
type-1 program and B has chosen the type-2 program. Then the viewer’s
choice will depend on the number of advertisements on each channel:
￿ Assume broadcaster A has fewer advertisements:
If A has the lower advertising level, all type-1 viewers will choose A.
Further, those viewers of type 2 for whom













will choose A, too. The fraction of the N type-2 viewers that choose
broadcaster A can be calculated by dividing the right hand side of the above






￿ Assume broadcaster A has more advertisements:
If A has the higher advertising level, then its program is chosen by all type-
1 viewers except those for whom (note that the right hand side is negative
in this case)BIBLIOGRAPHY 34













The fraction of the N type-1 viewers that broadcaster A loses can be
calculated by dividing the right hand side of the above expression through






￿ Assume broadcasters have the same advertising levels:














will watch B. All viewers who do not watch their preferred program
switch oﬀ because of the excessive advertising.
We can use the information from above to determine the broadcasters’
proﬁt functions, i.e.,






with R(aA) = p(aA)aA and






with R(aB) = p(aB)aB.
II Commercials and IPP:
￿ Assume broadcaster A has fewer advertisements:BIBLIOGRAPHY 35
If A has the lower overall advertising level, all type-1 viewers will choose
A. Further, those viewers of type 2 for whom



















will choose A, too. The fraction of the N type-2 viewers that broadcaster
A gains can be calculated by dividing the right hand side of the above ex-








￿ Assume broadcaster A has more advertisements:
If A has more advertising, then its program is watched by all type-1
viewers except those for whom (note that the right hand side is negative in
this case)



















The fraction of the N type-1 viewers that broadcaster A loses can be
calculated by dividing the right hand side of the above expression through







￿ Assume broadcasters have the same advertising levels:


















will watch B. All viewers who do not watch their preferred program
switch oﬀ because of excessive advertising.















◦(aA) + R(zA)] − C














◦(aB) + R(zB)] − C
with R◦(aB) = p◦(aB)aB, R(zB) = q(zB)zB. Note that the proﬁt func-
tions necessarily include both types of revenues, R◦(aB) and R(zB), because
broadcasters’ sell the same amount of a and z.